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 A central ideological justification for Central and East European (CEE) 
countries joining key international institutions lies in what Aleksander Smolar and 
Magdalena Potocka named the last great myth of 1989:  the return to Europe 
(Smolar and Potocka 12).  Yet, the very idea of Europe is fraught with contradiction 
and complexity for having represented diverse things over the course of several 
centuries – from Christendom to the balance of power system.  Nevertheless, 
Western Europe acquired a monopoly on the term during the Cold War, limiting the 
‘Europe’ of ‘return to Europe’ fame and fortune to its positive characteristics:  
wealth, democracy, market economies, human rights, and civilization.  What the 
‘return to Europe’ as an ideology ultimately means is the re-unification of the two 
formerly separated parts of geographical Europe, with the drab, less well off, and 
more traditional ‘East’ mirroring the sparkling, rich, and modern ‘West.’ 
At the immediate end of the Cold War, the return trip meant first and 
foremost re-establishing civil society to ensure individual and societal freedoms.  
The emphasis on civil society was a legacy of communism, a time when the formal 
realm of politics was not only out of reach for most, but taken to be inherently 
corrupt. The idea of forging a ‘third way’ between capitalism and socialism also 
gained ground to avoid the empty consumerism of the former and the coerciveness 
of the latter.  The second path towards Europe, one that would gain in prominence 
as indigenous civil society and third way ideologies faded, was through joining all 
key pan-European and international organizations:  the OSCE, OECD, NATO, EU, and 
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the Council of Europe (COE).1  Among these, the EU stands out for having the most 
extensive demands for reform, namely the requirement that incoming states adopt 
the acquis communitaire. 
Along with the idea of returning to Europe, ‘democracy and markets’ rose in 
importance as ideological staples of CEE’s transformation.  The emphasis on 
markets and democracy had both domestic and international catalysts.  
Domestically, both were taken to be the sources of West European peace and 
prosperity, an assumption that gave these ideas the shiny patina lost decades ago in 
the West.  Internationally, democracy and markets were celebrated globally after 
the end of the Cold War.  Their promotion was not limited to Europe, but extended 
also to U.S. foreign policy.  Yet, the difference between the ‘markets’ stressed by the 
neoliberal Washington Consensus and those stressed by Brussels was indeed stark.  
While the former wanted states excused from the process of creating markets, the 
latter preferred an institutional makeover for states to create a new framework 
within which to embed emerging markets (Bruszt 128). 
To be sure, the rise of democracy (and democratization) in CEE has attracted 
far greater scholarly attention than liberalism.  In 1989, the central question was 
how to develop democracy and capitalism simultaneously with international 
institutions understood as a way to further consolidate democracy and markets 
already created by domestic forces. Later, one group of scholars began to emphasize 
the influence of institutions and consequently questioned whether the nature of the 
integration process (particularly via the adoption of the EU’s aquis) might lead to 
the unfortunate export of the EU’s infamous ‘democratic deficit’ to CEE (Holmes, 
Grabbe, Grzymala-Busse and Innes).  Other scholars predicted that the EU accession 
process would help create a group of ‘dependant democracies’ in place of mature EU 
member states (Jacoby). 
                                                 
1  Certainly, emphasis on creating civil society has continued through the involvement of 
international institutions. 
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The few existing studies on liberalism, on the other hand, focus on the 
domestic determinants of liberalism with some attention given to international 
financial institutions’ influence in laying the ground for market economies (Szacki, 
Suda and Musil, Frankel Paul et al).  This article will illustrate that there is much 
more to liberalism in the postcommunist context than has been acknowledged.  A 
sizeable effort has indeed emerged to transplant a relatively coherent liberal 
ideology to the region, one exported not merely through the conditionality of 
international financial institutions, but also through the conditionality and 
socialization of organizations like COE, OECD, NATO, OSCE, and EU.   
Socialization and membership conditionality have been the two methods of 
bringing EU liberalism to Central and East European countries (Kelly 2004 19).  
Used to the greatest extent by the OSCE which admitted most CEEs relatively 
quickly after 1989 and several countries during the Cold War, normative pressure 
or socialization involves efforts to get CEE elites to change policy in line with post-
Cold War norms without making membership conditional on doing so.  Beyond 
creating the post of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE 
HCNM) in December 1992 as a conflict prevention measure, one that helped raise 
the organization’s profile once the EU began to consult the OSCE HCNM on a regular 
basis, the OSCE used other means to influence minority policy that fit within the 
rubric of normative pressure:  (1) the establishment of field offices (or missions) 
within countries thought to have the potential for conflict to monitor treatment of 
minorities and to interact regularly with officials, (2)  short-term visits by experts 
and/or elites from other OSCE member states to determine the extent to which 
these countries adopted policies in line with OSCE guidelines (Kelley 2004 17) (3) 
declarations and official statements evaluating current policies that might also 
indicate recommendations for future changes as well as the formal statement of 
norms in official documents such as the Copenhagen Document or the Framework 
Convention, and (4) dispatching teams of legal experts to provide advice during the 
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policy-making process  (Kelley 2002 14).  Particularly unique to the OSCE’s methods 
has been the establishment of missions that bring a small number of people in to 
work on a daily basis with local officials on a variety of issues  --  not merely 
concerning human and minority rights, but also on topics such as strengthening 
independent judiciaries, the rule of law, and independent media. 
 Conditionality, on the other hand, has been used more by the COE, especially 
by the EU, and occasionally by NATO  --  though the COE also used normative 
pressure to coax CEEs to adopt policies in line with post-Cold War norms.  
Conditionality creates greater incentives to change given linkages to membership in 
Europe’s most prominent international institutions.  EU conditionality has involved:  
(1)  promises of aid and trade preferences,  (2)  monitoring and benchmarking (i.e. 
the submission of yearly progress reports that rank applicants’ success in meeting 
membership requirements, other reports and decisions made at meetings requiring 
specific action by candidates, evaluations prior to formal accession negotiations to 
identify discrepancies between EU and national law), (3)  accession negotiations 
that involved deliberations over 31 chapters as well as ongoing benchmarking and 
monitoring (Kelley 2002 14) and (4)  declarations from the Presidency and 
resolutions from the European Parliament along with other official declarations and 
demarches urging reform (Kelley 2004 19).  My use of the term ‘conditionality’ 
generally refers to either NATO and especially to EU membership conditionality. 
 
EU Liberalism as a ‘Stealth Ideology’ 
EU liberalism has three components:  (1)  the ‘standard’ liberal emphasis on 
individual rights, the rule of law, constitutional democracy, freedom, and market 
economics, (2) a rather unconventional support for minority rights (by 
contemporary norms), and specifically concerning the EU (3)  a seemingly 
schizophrenic emphasis on economic integration that involves, first bringing down 
borders for the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services between 
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member states, and second, market regulation to diminish the social downsides of 
capitalism.  While many would question whether minority protections are indeed 
‘liberal,’ they are nevertheless included for two reasons:  (1)  post-Cold War 
minority rights are heavily indebted to individualistic Cold War human rights 
doctrine, and (2)  some liberals supported the idea of minority rights prior to the 
Second World War.  The work of Will Kymlicka has done much to change how 
minority rights are conceptualized by claiming that formally unilingual and 
seemingly liberal countries such as the U.S. are inherently assimilationist. 
Clearly, EU liberalism is much more than mere ‘markets.’  This may be why it 
is something of a ‘stealth ideology’ – a deeply-transforming politico-economic 
program that has not yet been fully represented in political discourse or considered 
by scholars.  It is strikingly divorced from the locally grown notions of civil society 
and the ‘third way’ from 1989, which raises the question of whether it can be 
successfully incorporated.  Concerning the two contradictory elements in EU 
liberalism’s third distinguishing feature, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks have 
referred to each as ‘projects’ forming the basis of official EU discussion concerning 
the organization’s future trajectory since the 1980s.  First is the ‘neoliberal project’ 
spurring competition between governments to create the most attractive conditions 
for firms and investment – thus, in a sense, getting states ‘out of markets’ way (or at 
least out of firms’ way).  Second is the ‘project for regulated capitalism’ that 
increases EU regulation over the Single Market for the purpose of mitigating 
capitalism’s negative social outcomes.  The pursuit of these projects, in effect, 
exchanges national governments’ control over their individual domestic markets for 
EU regulation over the enlarged market.  Some would argue that doing so ultimately 
increases domestic governments’ control in the first place through allowing regular 
and legitimate involvement in their neighbors’ domestic affairs (Moravscik 485-6).  
While both sit uneasily together, these two projects indeed reflect the contradiction 
in liberalisms mixing a high regard for ‘negative liberties’  --  rights that keep 
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governments and others from coercively interfering in individuals’ lives – with 
varying degrees of support for ‘positive liberties’ – state entitlements aimed at 
increasing equality of opportunity.  Mark Pollack rightly notes that the neoliberal 
project has had greater emphasis as primary EU treaties have made the creation of 
the Single Market a high priority even while also mandating its regulation (Pollack 
268).  
EU liberalism is an ideology that has essentially developed outside of CEE and 
has at least two primary sources:  (1) the effort to create a harmonized European 
market among rich, highly developed West European economies, and (2) West 
European concerns about post-Cold War security that sparked the development of 
the post-Cold War minority rights regime exclusively for CEE states.  The 
requirement that CEE economies adopt Single Market policies and the post-Cold 
War minority rights regime then leads to the question of what happens when, in 
Jerzy Szacki’s words, such ideas “are transported to entirely different conditions 
from those in which they originated” (Szacki 12).  Ironically, EU liberalism is the 
polar opposite of the ideology orienting the drive to create ethnically homogenous 
states during and after the Second World War, an ideology strongly favoring state 
support for particular nationalities.  While political liberalism may indeed be less 
appealing for state-possessing majority nationalities as it fractures majority rule, 
more problematic for the region are the implications of EU liberalism’s export:  (1)  
a sizeable shift away from official state support for particular nationalities 
stemming both from the minority rights regime and anti-discrimination principles 
embedded in the four Single Market freedoms (free movement of people, goods, 
capital, and services), and (2)  the frequent disjuncture between rhetoric and reality 
in regard to anti-discrimination principles, one that can diminish the credibility of 
liberal values.  For example, Western Europe is not required to adhere to the post-
Cold War minority protection regime, and while CEE has been brought into the EU’s 
market regulation scheme, older member states have been keener to protect 
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sensitive industries there than to diminish the social and economic dislocations of 
capitalism.   
Considering Western Europe’s post-Second World War ‘velvet revolution,’ 
Mark Lilla reminds us that this half of the continent only grudgingly accepted 
liberalism over the course of decades, an acceptance that was anything but 
preordained, and only likely condoned because of economic growth and adequate 
social-welfare policy’ (Lilla 133).  As the West European precedent suggests, 
economic growth and social welfare were key to the acceptance of liberal values.  A 
great deal of hope in CEE rests on the EU to deliver an increased standard of living 
and overall economic development in CEE.  Yet, there has neither been an emphasis 
on social protection in exporting EU liberalism nor has the region ever come close to 
West European levels of development historically – with the exception of the Czech 
Lands and Hungary.  David Good’s comparative analysis of CEE countries’ historical 
economic growth, after all, indicates that CEE’s position relative to other European 
states from 1870 to 1989 remained relatively unchanged (Good 50).  When 
combined with EU liberalism’s illiberal export, such conditions do not bode well for 
liberalism’s future in much of the region. 
 
The Illiberal Rise of EU Liberalism  
 Without a doubt, many CEE citizens desired political and economic change 
along liberal lines after 1989 including:  (1) the creation of pluralist party systems; 
(2) the recognition of human rights in order to ensure basic individual freedoms; 
and (3) the creation of market economies.  Domestic support for some of the 
‘standard liberal’ elements in EU liberalism no doubt existed.  Less popular, 
however, was the idea of minority rights as well as of substantially reducing state 
control over capital markets and especially land markets in favor of foreign 
investment.  Rogers Brubaker, Katherine Verdery, and others have shown why 
national majorities did not embrace minority rights after the end of the Cold War, all 
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of which used nationalism as a way to establish their respective states’ de facto 
independence.  Retaining state control over land and capital flows runs along the 
same lines to protect ‘national’ interests.   
The emergence of EU liberalism began with various aid programs and 
institutions: the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), IMF aid, and a new program called Poland and Hungary:  Assistance for 
Restructuring Their Economy (PHARE).  EU member states created the EBRD in 
1990 to provide aid to CEE in the form of technical assistance, policy advice, security 
offerings, and equity investment. The conditions of its receipt emphasized political 
over economic reform:  respect for basic human rights, acceptance of a multiparty 
system, respect for the rule of law, free but secret elections, and finally policies 
laying the groundwork for market economies. 
IMF conditionality was more expressly economic with the receipt of financial 
assistance conditional on the country’s performance and adherence to a previously-
agreed upon timetable of reforms comprising a market-creating program.  Though 
varying for each CEE country, the primary elements of mandated reforms included:  
privatization, substantial trade liberalization, restrictive credit and monetary 
policies, rapid and almost complete price liberalization, the reform of banking and 
financial systems, tight fiscal discipline (including near total elimination of price 
subsidies), and changes in incomes policies (Senior Nello 84-5).  Given that the early 
postcommunist governments had a stronger preference for neoliberal economic 
reform (as the opposite of and seemingly necessary antidote to communist 
economics), the IMF program met with approval.  Though the effects of markets 
would soon lead to economic and social dislocation, at least at the outset the EBRD- 
and IMF-driven reforms had social support. 
Finally, PHARE became the primary aid program for CEE.  It was originally 
aimed at providing non-returnable financial assistance to Poland and Hungary for 
the express purpose of helping these countries go from planned to market 
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economies and was quickly expanded to encompass all CEE states.2  Application to 
PHARE had conditions similar to the EBRD:  the establishment of a multiparty 
political system, respect for human rights, the organization of free elections, and the 
creation of market economies (Maresceau 12). 
 
Promoting Minority Rights 
 
 Divergence between CEE desires and international institutions’ conditionality 
began, however, with the emphasis on minority rights.  While liberals and others in 
CEE countries supported the idea of providing minorities with basic human rights, 
the emphasis on minority protection came more from West European states noting, 
first, that ethnic conflict over minorities was a key security threat after the erosion 
of the U.S.S.R.’s control over CEE, and second, that such conflict could potentially 
destabilize Western Europe through the westward movement of refugees and 
immigrants.  Heather Grabbe has noted, in fact, that unrestricted immigration from 
eastern countries essentially replaced the threat of a Soviet invasion as Western 
Europe’s key security concern, at least with respect to the East (Grabbe 2000 520).  
It was thus of paramount importance, from the perspective of these countries, to 
provide incentives to encourage CEE minorities to stay put –  though much less so 
for state-possessing nationalities. 
The primary international organizations working on the minority rights issue 
were the OSCE and the COE.  The OSCE’s 1990 Paris summit demonstrated clear 
commitment to liberal values in committing member states to the following actions:  
to hold free and fair elections, to respect the rule of law, to uphold the rights of 
national minorities, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to 
promote free markets (Weitz 1992).  Likewise, the COE required prospective 
member states to “accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment of all 
                                                 
2 After a July 1989 meeting of the G-7, the European Commission was given the task of 
coordinating the PHARE program.   
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persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”3  While 
the OSCE played a greater role in developing the contemporary minority rights 
regime, the COE put more effort into developing uniform criteria and has had more 
leverage on CEE states concerning its implementation. Not only did several CEE 
countries join the OSCE long before 1989 (Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland joined in 
1973), but the OSCE’s power to realize the regime in CEE was mitigated by its status 
as a traveling conference.  It only began to metamorphasize into an international 
organization after rising to the challenges of the immediate post-Cold War era.   
By the mid-1990s, the OSCE and the COE had developed a distinct minority 
rights regime, one that centered around three standard-setting documents:  the 
OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document, the OSCE’s 1991 Geneva Report, and the 
Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities.  Defined as “individuals belonging to national minorities,” the 
benefactors of new European norms would have rights to:  define their identity, 
have full access to human rights accorded to all, be equal before the law and thus 
free from state-sponsored discrimination, and to maintain and develop their own 
culture. 
The regime that emerged was essentially the product of two radically 
opposed views on minority protections.  On the one hand, statist-oriented countries 
such as Greece, France, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia demanded that these rights 
be framed in individualistic human rights language.  On the other hand, countries 
with significant numbers of ‘kin’ abroad such as Hungary and Germany promoted 
more extensive protections to discourage those identifying themselves as 
Hungarians and Germans from moving to their respective ‘mother’ states.  For 
Hungary in particular, it was a matter of keeping Hungarians living in areas that had 
previously belonged to Hungary.  The former view clearly prevailed as primary 
                                                 
3 Article 3 of the Council’s Statutes quoted in Weitz (1990 50).  Beyond this, a key 
membership requirement was that each state’s delegation to the Council must be composed of 
representatives from all prominent political parties.   
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post-Cold War treaties referenced ‘individuals belonging to national minorities’ 
rather than to ‘national minorities.’  Yet, it is possible to take a more collectivist view 
given that several of the rights delineated are actions that usually occur in the 
presence of others  --  for example, the right of cultural preservation through 
festivals and publicly-celebrated holidays, the use of minority languages in the 
private and public spheres, and the ability to create organizations (Tesser 486).   
Though the COE and OSCE put a good deal of effort into developing post-Cold 
War standards on minority protections, the existence of genuine pressure to adopt 
them might seem questionable given the minimal enforcement mechanisms at the 
Council’s and especially the OSCE’s disposal.  Yet, pressure did exist, stemming from 
the fact that most CEE states very much desired EU entry and membership in the 
COE became a de facto prerequisite for joining the EU by 1993 (Switalski 27).  This 
setup thus provided the COE in particular with the leverage to persuade CEE elites 
to adopt such policies.   
However, it is also true that the EU’s rhetorical support for minority rights 
was belied by two things:  (1) West European states were not under similar 
pressures; making it quite ambiguous whether human rights really mattered to the 
EU (Sadurski 5), and that (2)   Germany has been a key sponsor of EU expansion 
eastwards, a leading European power that itself defines de facto membership on 
ethnic blood ties.  Germany’s influence, in fact, has led the EU-15 to favor parties 
with the strongest pro-Western attitudes while not making a great deal of their 
nationalist politics. 
  
Promoting the Single Market 
 
As for minority rights, CEE societies were not enamored of all Single Market 
freedoms equally, especially ending formal state control over land and capital 
markets allowing foreign ownership.  The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, in 
fact, indicates a general lack of support for foreign ownership in the region ranging 
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from 64% against in Lithuania (in 1993) to a low of 24% against in Hungary (in 
1993), with Hungary unusually open to foreign firms in the 1990s  --  though less so 
to foreign land ownership. 
Pressures to take on the characteristics of the EU’s Single Market arose 
around the same time as the emergence of the new European minority rights 
regime.  In fact, early EU involvement with CEE countries had far more to do with 
the promotion of the Single Market than with human or minority rights.  The EU 
made numerous bilateral agreements – Europe Agreements – with CEE states to 
establish formal trade relations, East-West cooperation, and to promote the 
practices of the Single market – particularly the free movement of goods, capital, 
services, and labor across borders over a ten-year period, ultimately helping to 
restructure CEE economies to bring them more in line with the EU’s Single Market 
(de Weydenthal 1992 25). Yet, the Commission made it clear in a 1990 
announcement that the purpose of the Agreements was NOT to lay the grounds for 
accession, but instead to develop incentives for reform in CEE countries and to 
protect EU interests. 
Requirements for being considered a candidate for a Europe Agreement 
signaled clear intention to promote reforms in line with EU liberalism:  “the 
introduction of the rule of law, the respect for human rights, the establishment of a 
multi-party system with corresponding free and fair elections and finally, the 
introduction of a market economy” (European Information Service).  According to 
the Agreements, the desired integration of the European market mandated that CEE 
countries alter existing laws to conform with EU law; albeit without requiring these 
countries to give evidence of their immediate success (Cernat 9). 
For the most part, the Europe Agreements promoted anti-discrimination 
policies by laying down reciprocal rights for the EU and CEE countries to establish 
firms and other enterprises on each other’s territory (de Weydenthal 1992 25).  
However, there were key exceptions.  While existing member states offered 
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favorable trade terms – with the EU making concessions to CEE before the latter 
reciprocated, sensitive EU-15 industries such as agricultural products, textiles, coal, 
and steel were protected from CEE competition.  Customs duties on CEE products 
from these sectors would be eliminated at a slower rate than on other imports.  
Beyond that, CEE countries had to open their respective markets to heavily 
subsidized West European agricultural products non-tariff barriers – regulations 
involving labeling information and the specific ways plants and animals are handled 
that – have often kept CEE goods from circulating freely in the Single Market. 
Indeed, the EU appears the most ‘socialist’ when it aims to protect the 
interests of older member states.  A perfect example concerns EU control over steel 
production in Poland.  Preston Keat’s insightful article on an agreement between the 
Polish government, Polish steel manufacturers (85% of which had been owned or 
controlled by the government), and the EU presents strong evidence for an ‘EU 
socialism’ in older member states’ interests that runs against the principles of EU 
liberalism.  While cautious market forecasts predicted an increase in the domestic 
demand for steel from 2000 to 2010, the settlement limits domestic production to 
13.5 million tons by 2002, thus reducing profits that might otherwise have been 
made.  The agreement ultimately leads to a decrease in production that is not driven 
by market forces, but because of a deal made to keep all steel plants (even inefficient 
ones) functioning.  Along with financial help from the EU, the Polish government 
offsetting this loss of potential profit by investing $2.5 billion towards 
modernization in nearly all the country’s 24 steel plants between late-1998 and 
2005.  While approximately 40,000 steel workers would be laid off, they would 
receive more than ample benefits compliments mostly of the EU.  Keat sums up the 
situation accordingly:  “… what the EU deal really does is legitimate some form of 
systematic government intervention in the industry that might otherwise not have 
occurred.  It also highlights the fact that organized interests in Western Europe were 
able to get what they wanted – reduced competition from Poland” (Keat 219).  In 
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summary, the regulation of capitalism in a broader Europe, often to the tune of older 
EU members’ preferences, belies the non-discrimination rhetoric intended for 
candidate countries. 
EU hesitation in offering membership and later delaying candidates entry 
certainly did not help matters.  After being asked when Poland would become an EU 
member, for example, Poland’s former Foreign Minister Władysław Bartoszewski 
signaled just this much by indicating that the science fiction writer Stanisław Lem 
would be more likely to know (Bartoszewski 71).  The EU has indeed used various 
methods to stall the expansion process that have, at times, delivered a great deal of 
frustration to applicant states.  The EU signed the Europe Agreements beginning in 
1991, after all, not merely to lay the basis for formal association and stimulate 
liberalization, but also to essentially put off the question of whether these countries 
would be allowed to join.  When requesting formally that their progress towards 
possible membership be assessed in September 1992, Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia received a rather ambiguous response with nothing concrete on the 
possibility of their entry (de Weydenthal 1993 29).  Though the EU sent 
progressively stronger positive signals beginning in 1993, the primary stalling tactic 
in the second half of the 1990’s was to continually push back the projected date of 
entry, or even more frustrating for the candidates, to change the requirements of 
admission. 
 
Combining Minority Rights and Single Market Freedoms in the Pre-Accession Process 
 
Only during the June 1993 European Council summit in Copenhagen did more 
concrete promises for accession emerge.  Though no timetables were established, 
nor were specific countries invited to begin accession negotiations, the Council 
provided a clear statement of intent:  “Accession will take place as soon as an 
associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership” (Bulletin).  The 
essential conditions for joining established at Copenhagen signal that EU liberalism, 
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building off the conditionality of the Europe Agreements and the emerging minority 
rights regime, had indeed taken shape in the simultaneous emphasis on minorities 
and markets:  (1)  the existence of stable democratic institutions including rights, 
respect for, and protection of minorities as well as the rule of law; (2) the presence 
of a market economy capable of withstanding competitive pressures; and (3) the 
ability to take on all of the requirements that come with membership, including 
monetary, economic, and political integration.  Shortly afterwards, the EU launched 
the 1994-1995 Pact for Stability for the purpose of encouraging CEE states to reach 
formal agreements with their neighbors concerning the treatment of minorities as 
well as borders (Smith 122). 
At the same time, the EU began to lay the grounds for accession by developing 
a specific preparatory framework for entry.  The ‘pre-accession process’ increased 
the amount of pressure on CEE hopefuls to harmonize with EU law and policy.  
During the first half of the 1990s, prospective members were only to make some 
effort in approximating EU law.  This began to change with the European 
Commission’s 1995 publication of the White Paper on the “Preparation of the 
Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal 
Market of the Union.”  The White Paper’s purpose was to present guidelines to help 
associate countries prepare for potential membership – specifically to help CEE 
countries undertake reforms the Commission deemed essential for the functioning 
of the Single Market.  Prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality, the 
White Paper emphasized implementing the four main Single Market freedoms 
concerning goods, services, people, and capital (White Paper). 
Pressure to adopt Single Market policies increased with the development of 
Agenda 2000 in 1997, a Commission document meant to satisfy Council demands 
for creating a monitoring process for candidate states.  Agenda 2000 was the 
Commission’s effort to present “in a single framework the broad perspectives for 
the development of the Union and its policies beyond the turn of the century” 
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(Agenda 11).  It reiterated some of the Copenhagen goals in delimiting three areas of 
concern:  (1) democracy and the rule of law, (2) human rights, and finally (3) 
respect for minorities.  Interestingly enough, Agenda 2000 stressed human and 
minority rights more than the development of the Single Market.  This was likely 
due to concern over CEE candidates’ ‘hot spots’ – Russians in Estonia and Latvia and 
particularly Hungarians in Slovakia – as well as continued concern over the region’s 
Roma.  Cynics claimed that doing so would give the EU means to delay the expansion 
process. 
 At the same time, pre-accession dictated that candidate countries would be 
subject to reports on their progress.  In July 1997, the Commission published its 
opinions (avis), documents outlining the extent to which the entrants had met the 
Copenhagen criteria and the steps needed to completely fulfill them.  To simplify 
matters, the EU created the Accession Partnerships to bring the different forms of 
pre-accession assistance into one package, prioritizing those areas acutely in need of 
work.  Thereafter, EU demands became more explicit and aid was directed 
exclusively toward meeting the requirements of accession (Grabbe 1999 15).  At the 
same time, the EU made an effort to more outwardly express its drive to promote 
liberal values.  Following revisions undertaken in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Treaty on European Union states:  “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to Member States” (Laffan 341). 
Particularly with the Accession Partnerships, PHARE became explicitly 
concerned with helping candidates to adopt the aquis, rather than to meet more 
general political and economic objectives established by the entrants themselves 
(Grabbe 1999 16).  Later, additional aid programs were created to help applicants 
meet the demands of pre-accession:  the Structural Adjustment Program for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (SAPARD), the Pre-Accession Structural 
Instrument (ISPA) (concerning structural policies), and later Community Assistance 
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for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization (CARDS) for Albania and the 
states of the former Yugoslavia (Maresceau 35). 
While the Accession Partnerships do not have a base in any treaty or bilateral 
agreement (as they are entirely EU-initiated), they have made the Copenhagen 
conditions “quasi-legal” by creating a series of sanctions and a control procedure 
and have ultimately become the main documents orienting CEE-EU relations (Grabe 
1999 17).4  Heather Grabbe rightly notes that the Accession Partnerships hold 
limited understanding of how market economies should appear, uniformly 
minimizing the role of varied social actors in industry and the economy in general 
along Anglo-American neoliberal lines (Grabbe 1999 21). 
 
Conclusion 
The 1990s witnessed the rise of EU liberalism in CEE, a ‘stealth ideology’ 
promoted primarily through the conditionality of key international institutions that 
remained quite unknown to societies uncertain of all the policy changes needed to 
‘join Europe.’  Its emphasis on minorities and border-effacing markets indeed runs 
quite contrary to ideas of civil society and the ‘third way’ emerging at the immediate 
end of communism – not to mention the drive to create ethnically pure states of the 
20th century.  Nevertheless, CEE elites’ and societies’ desire to ‘return to Europe’ – a 
return essentially defined by West European elites and key international 
organizations – would mean adopting a program of specific reforms laid out by the 
West and designed, to a large extent, to satisfy West European interests in 
furthering the Single Market and preventing population flows from the East.   
At least up until the time of entry, the asymmetrical nature of the EU-CEE 
relationship contributed to EU liberalism’s illiberal transfer with EU member states 
acting as ‘players in the game’ who simultaneously had the power to determine who 
                                                 
4 Heather Grabbe rightly notes that the Accession Partnerships hold limited understanding of 
how market economies should appear, uniformly minimizing the role of varied social actors in 
industry and the economy in general along Anglo-American neoliberal lines (Grabbe 1999 21). 
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gets what and who does not.  With the publication, first, of the avis describing 
economic and political conditions in these states up until May 1997, and second, the 
Commission’s regular reports on the status of each country’s preparations, this 
reporting procedure not only further entrenched the hierarchy of West over East, 
but also influenced relations among the applicants.  The pendulum swung from 
candidate countries sometimes uniting against EU criticism, and at other times 
dividing over the different degrees of reform deemed necessary in each state.   
At the same time, and indeed through much of the 1990s, a debate ran among 
EU member states over the development of a two-tier EU with ‘core’ states pursuing 
the integration project further and ‘periphery’ states maintaining greater 
sovereignty.  For CEE, the implications of this key debate for incoming states were 
interpreted as a coerced ‘choice’ between being first- and second-class European 
states  --  as the EU-15 ruled out flexible options for the new CEE states, only further 
calling into question the validity of the EU’s alleged anti-discrimination principles 
(Smith 108).   
Despite the nature of the process, accession negotiations finally opened in 
1998 between the EU and six states – Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus, Poland, Estonia, 
and the Czech Republic.  Six other applicants followed – Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia – when negotiations opened with this second group in 
2000.  They were completed in December 2002 – with the exception of Bulgaria and 
Romania which eventually joined in 2007.  For the most part, CEE candidates were 
expected to adopt the EU’s acquis wholesale, leaving many CEE states to set up 
offices charged with the task of approving and implementing EU law without having 
to endure lengthy parliamentary debate.  The speeding up of the process of 
harmonizing with EU law has been particularly important in spurring concern that 
the EU is exporting its democratic deficit to CEE.  
The bigger worry lies in the illiberal export of EU liberalism, particularly 
through extending Europe’s minority rights regime only to CEE countries, the 
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haphazard application of anti-discrimination policy of the Single Market (mostly in 
cases not harmful to ‘older’ member states’ sensitive sectors), and that the four 
Single Market freedoms that do not mix well with the after-effects of the drive to 
create ethnically pure nation-states. Bringing down borders for free movement, 
particularly concerning land purchases, can revitalize fears concerning sovereignty 
over formerly contested land areas that experienced population expulsions – a key 
part of the drive to create ethnically pure nation states..  In this way, the Single 
Market freedoms can lead to questions over who owns what and potentially also 
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